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ARTICLE 
F ACTFINDING AS A SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE 
HON. JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL* 
Over the years, I have from time to time participated in academic dis-
cussions of the issue of whether judges' religious convictions playa role in 
their decisions, particularly their decisions on issues with explicit religious 
dimensions. I I have always been somewhat uncomfortable in these discus-
sions, in part because I do not belong to a faith community that instructs me 
as a matter of doctrine on the appropriate position to take on our major 
religious-political disputes and in part because, as a distrkt judge, such dis-
putes rarely, if ever, come before me. If they did, my determination would 
be essentially meaningless as the ultimate legal issues would be resolved by 
the opinion of a reviewing court. 
But another source of discomfort was even deeper. These discussions 
usually paid little attention to the place where I believe ethical and/or relig-
ious views play the greatest role: in judges' determination of the facts of a 
controversy. Here, trial court judges have an enormously important role to 
play: in the facts we make part of the evidentiary record-whether by our 
evidentiary rulings or by our power to call for and hear evidence the parties 
might not otherwise present to us-and in the facts we choose to emphasize 
in our decisions. In these ways, by our substantial power to shape the evi-
dentiary record, and in our largely unreviewable power to decide what evi-
dence should be believed or credited as salient or determinative, our most 
important values-whether their source is ethical, religious, or politkal-
have a frequently dispositive impact on the outcome. Indeed, as every prac-
ticing lawyer knows, the facts the lawyers prove and the facts the judge 
finds frequently compel the disposition of the case. 
* United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of Illinois. The author would 
like to thank Richard Rosengarten, who understood these ideas when they were diffuse and incho-
ate; he provided not only encouragement hut indispensable guidance and suggestions for further 
reading. Without his help and support, this paper would never have seen the light of day. The 
author is also immensely grateful to her law clerks, Jason Odeshoo and Jess Krannich. for their 
substantive suggestions, invaluable editorial assistance and unfailing enthusiasm for this projecl. 
I. See, e.g .. Joan B. Gottschall. Response [0 Judge Wendell Griffen. 81 MARQ. L. REV. 533 
(1998). 
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The legal literature generally fails to address factfinding as an activity 
of religious or moral importance, although there is recognition that how 
judges (particularly appellate judges) view the facts can have a significant 
impact on the result. Outside the boundaries of writing about the law, how-
ever, there is a good deal of discussion of the moral and spiritual impor-
tance of our assessment of the facts that confront us. 
In this article, I examine the work of two individuals who believed that 
our vision of what confronts us-our effort to pay attention and our ability 
to do so-has spiritual and moral significance. The first is Simone Weil, the 
religious thinker; the second is Iris Murdoch, a philosopher and novelist on 
whom Weil had a great influence. I discuss their concept of "attention" and 
show how the facts judges attend to significantly affect the decisions they 
reach. I also discuss the systemic pressures that prevent judges from attend-
ing to facts as well as they perhaps should. It is my hope that in doing so, I 
will contribute in a small way to shifting the discussion about the signifi-
cance of judges' religious and moral views. I suggest that this significance 
has less to do with how judges come down on politically contentious issues 
and more to do with their efforts to become people of broader and more 
inclusive vision. 
I. SIMONE WElL'S CONCEPT OF "ATTENTION" 
The philosopher who most explicitly linked the work of assessing real-
ity to its religious or spiritual dimension was Simone Weil. Weil was born 
in France in 1909, lived during Hitler's rise to power, and died in London in 
1943. She wrote at length about what she termed "attention." Weil defined 
attention as a way of looking at something outside oneself by which "[t]he 
soul empties itself of all its own contents in order to receive into itself the 
being it is looking at, just as he is, in all his truth."2 Weil, as contemporary 
critic Sissela Bok has said, believed in the "primacy of attention."3 
Attention is outward-looking rather than self-centered, and authenti-
cally seeks the truth. True attention consists of a suspension of thought, so 
that our thought is empty and detached and ready to be penetrated by what 
is outside of ourselves.4 Error results when thought seizes upon an idea too 
hastily and is prematurely blocked, and is not, therefore, open to the truth.s 
According to Weil, we must set our hearts upon determining the truth but 
not allow ourselves to seek it actively.6 We must be content to wait, to give 
our attention to the data of a problem without trying to solve it, or to wait 
2. SIMONE WElL, WAITING FOR GOD 115 (Emma Craufurd trans., Harper & Row 1973) 
(1951). 
3. Sissela Bok, Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch: The Possibility of Dialogue, GENDER Is-
SlIES, Fall 2005, at 71, 76. 
4. See WElL, supra note 2, at 111. 
5. Id. at 112. 
6. ld. at 113. 
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for the right word to come of itself, rejecting all words that are inadequate.7 
Something in us, Weil argued, has a violent repugnance for true attention; 
but when we really concentrate our attention, and suspend our thought (our 
self-centered thought) as true attention requires, we destroy the evil within 
ourselves.8 
Weil did not believe that paying attention comes easily. Rather, learn-
ing to pay attention is a type of discipline-something we have to practice 
and work at. She emphasized, however, that many different kinds of activ-
ity provide opportunities to develop the power of attention. In her words, 
"[EJvery time that a human being succeeds in making an effort of attention 
with the sole idea of increasing his grasp of truth, he acquires a greater 
aptitude for grasping it, even if his effort produces no visible fruit."9 For 
example, WeB saw study-in which one focuses on trying to understand 
something or to solve a problem-as a form of practice in attention. For 
Weil, aptitude is not necessary in order for study to develop one's capacity 
for attention. Instead, however, two other qualities are necessary: first, a 
sincere effort to understand; and second, humility-a willingness to look at 
our failures honestly.lo "If these two conditions are perfectly carried out," 
she said, "there is no doubt that school studies are quite as good a road to 
sanctity as any other." II 
Ultimately, if we master attention, we can engage in the unselfish love 
of our neighbor and in prayer. W eil viewed prayer as the ultimate example 
of attention: the orientation of all the attention of which the soul is capable 
toward God. 12 The love of God, Weil said, has attention for its substance; 
the love of one's neighbor is the same love and is made of the same sub-
stance. 13 "The Gospel," she emphasized, "makes no distinction between the 
love of our neighbor and justice."14 What is most needed by someone who 
is unhappy is someone capable of giving him this attention, but most people 
who believe they have the capacity to give their attention to another do not 
in fact possess it. "The capacity to give one's attention to a sufferer is a 
very rare and difficult thing; it is almost a miracle; it is a miracle." 15 Atten-
tion has nothing to do, WeB noted, with emotional enthusiasms like 
"[wJarmth of heart, impUlsiveness [or] pity."16 Rather, it is a suspension of 
7. Id. 
8. Ill. at II L 
9. SIMONE WElL. Reflections Oil the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Lo1'f' (d' 
God, in THE SIMONE WElL READER 44, 46 (George A. Panic has cd., 1977). 
]0. Id. at 46--47. 
I L ld. at 47. 
12. WElL, supra note 2, at 105. 
13. Id. at 114. 
14. It!. at 139. 
15. lei. at 114. 
16. hi. 
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thought and feeling about ourselves so that we can attend to the condition of 
another. 
Wei! also spoke about justice, and her idea of justice is closely related 
to her idea of attention. "Justice in punishment," she wrote, "can be defined 
in the same way as justice in almsgiving."!7 It means giving our attention to 
any victim of affliction (another idea she wrote about at length) as a being 
and not as a thing.18 She maintained that we must never look at another 
being with contempt, because contempt is the opposite of attention. 19 We 
must not look at this other being as an "unfortunate," for to do so would be 
to fail to see the other as a being just like ourselves.20 Justice, for Weil, 
"consists of behaving exactly as though there were equality when one is the 
stronger in an unequal relationship."21 
In illustrating these aspects of her conception of attention, Weil in-
voked the legend of the Holy Grai1.22 In the legend of the Grail, as she 
recounted it, the Grail belongs to the first person who asks the guardian of 
the vessel, a king paralyzed by a painful wound, "What are you going 
through?"23 Similarly, the love of our neighbor simply means being able to 
say to him, "What are you going through?"24 
The parable of the Good Samaritan-to which Weil on a number of 
occasions referred-additionally exemplifies the importance of attention 
from a spiritual point of view, as well as its relevance to our daily lives. In 
the parable, Jesus' interlocutor was a lawyer, a detail which perhaps should 
not be ignored: 
And behold, a lawyer stood up to put him to the test, saying, 
"Teacher, what shall I do to inherit etemallife?" He said to him, 
"What is written in the law? How do you read?" And he an-
swered, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, 
and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all 
your mind; and your neighbor as yourself." And he said to him, 
"You have answered right; do this, and you will live." 
But he, desiring to justify himself, said to Jesus, "And who is my 
neighbor?" Jesus replied, "A man was going down from Jerusa-
lem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and 
beat him, and departed, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a 
priest was going down that road; and when he saw him he passed 
by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the 
place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, 
17. Id. at 153. 
18. Id. 
19. /d. 
20. See id. at 115. 
21. Id. at 143. 
22. Jd. at 115. 
23. Id. 
24. Jd. 
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as he journeyed, came to where he was; and when he saw him, he 
had compassion, and went to him and bound up his wounds, pour-
ing on oil and wine; then he set him on his own beast and brought 
him to an inn, and took care of him. And the next day he took out 
two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper, saying, 'Take care of 
him; and whatever more you spend, I will repay you when I come 
back.' Which of these three, do you think, proved neighbor to the 
man who fell among the robbers?" He said, "The one who 
showed mercy on him." And Jesus said to him, "Go and do 
likewise. "2~ 
329 
We all know that this story is about mercy to our neighbor, but it is 
also about who we regard as our neighbor. Many accounts of the parable 
remind us that as Jesus' contemporaries heard this story, they understood 
that the injured man was probably a Jew, and that Jews and Samaritans 
looked down upon one another and certainly were unlikely to think of one 
another as neighbors. Thus, it is significant that the priest and the Levite 
passed the injured man by; but the Samaritan, whom Jesus' audiences 
would never have thought of as the injured man's neighbor, responded to 
him as a neighbor should. 
Perhaps we should understand this parable as reminding us that we do 
not get to choose our neighbor. Rather, our neighbor is the person whose 
need we notice if we pay attention. And when we pay attention, the moral 
action that should follow is quite clear. If we fail to pay attention to the 
injured man, if we view him as merely an obstacle in the road, we cross the 
street like the priest and the Levite. We fail to see an injured neighbor 
before us and fail to ask what he is going through. Wei I said that those who 
pass by this "thing" scarcely notice it. Minutes later. they don't even re-
member that they saw i1.26 But the Samaritan who stops and looks and gives 
his attention to the "anonymous flesh lying inert by the roadside" is giving 
creative attention, seeing humanity where, without this attention, there was 
none.27 
When we as judges are given the responsibility of listening to dispu-
tants, who are often locked in a moral crisis with each other, and trying to 
determine where truth and justice lie in a dispute, we are called on, to the 
best of our ability, to pay attention. Paying attention, as Weil made clear, is 
more than simply trying not to be distracted. It is trying to ascertain the 
truth, unobstructed by our own biases, prejudices, self-interest and resent-
ments, as well as by the blinding limitations of our own experience. I sug-
gest that to the extent that the work of judging has a spiritual dimension, it 
inheres in this: that we are charged with paying close attention to our fellow 
human beings and trying, by listening to them, to find the truth. Listening to 
25. Luke 10:25-37 (Rev. Standard). 
26. WElL. supra note 2, at 146. 
27. ld. at 149. 
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others, hearing them, and reaching a fair assessment where both sides have 
been heard and feel that they have been heard, is what justice in its full 
significance is about. 
II. IRIS MURDOCH AND THE MORAL SIGNIFlCANCE OF ATTENTION 
Iris Murdoch, the novelist and philosopher, was born in England ap-
proximately a decade after Weil's birth and wrote at length about WeB and 
her concept of attention. Murdoch's philosophical project was to demon-
strate the error in the then-dominant philosophical view that ethics or mo-
rality inhered only in observable acts of will, not in internal, subjective 
thoughts. Weil's idea of attention suggests that something other than action 
is of critical importance, and that is what so attracted Murdoch. For Mur-
doch, as for Weil, the starting point is some rudimentary awareness of the 
other-that is, the ability to pay attention to the situation of others outside 
oneself. Without this, in the words of Sissela Bok, it is impossible "to rea-
son coherently about moral choice."28 Where Wei! believed that paying at-
tention was a religious imperative, essential to a real love of one's neighbor 
and of God, Murdoch tried to put Weil's ideas on a moral rather than a 
religious foundation-as essential to our proper relation to one another and 
to excellence in morality.29 
Murdoch's famous example of this follows: M, a mother-in-law, per-
ceives her daughter-in-law, D, as good-hearted but unpolished, juvenile, 
and lacking in dignity and refinement,3o M does not like D. She dislikes her 
pertness, her familiarity, her accent, and the way she dresses. She regrets 
that her son has bound her to D. M, however, treats D beautifully and does 
28. Bok, supra note 3, at 74. 
29. Murdoch used Wen's thinking about our relationship with God to get to her idea of our 
moral obligations to other people even if God is assumed to be absent or non-existent; an idea of 
"Good" without "God." The problems with this enterprise have been discussed by numerous theo-
logians. For an excellent collection of essays discussing this point, see IRIS MURDOCH AND THE 
SEARCH FOR HUMAN GOODNESS (Maria Antonaccio & William Schweiker eds., 1996), particularly 
Franklin I. Gamwell, On the Loss of Theism, in IRIS MURDOCH AND THE SEARCH FOR HUMAN 
GOODNESS, id., at 171; Stanley Hauerwas, Murdochian Muddles: Can We Get Through Them If 
God Does Not Exist?, in IRIS MURDOCH AND THE SEARCH FOR HUMAN GOODNESS, id., at 190; and 
William Schweiker, The Sovereignty of God's Goodness, in IRIS MURDOCH AND THE SEARCH FOR 
HUMAN GOODNESS. id., at 209. I will not attempt to deal with the question of the boundary be-
tween theology and morality, but find Weil's view, that wherever there is Good there is God, 
helpful in setting it aside for present purposes: 
Even the most narrow-minded of Catholics would not dare to affirm that compassion, 
gratitude, love of the beauty of the world, love of religious practices, and friendship 
belonged exclusively to those centuries and countries that recognized the Church. These 
forms of love are rarely found in their purity, but it would even be difficult to say that 
they were met with more frequently in those centuries and countries than in the others. 
To think that love in any of these forms can exist anywhere where Christ is absent is to 
belittle him so grievously that it amounts to an outrage. It is impious and almost 
sacrilegious. 
WElL, supra note 2, at 208. 
30. IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 16-18 (Routledge & Kegan 1970). 
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not let her feelings show. In Murdoch's hypothetical case, D dies or emi-
grates-the absence of D as an active agent being an essential condition of 
our certainty that what transpires thereafter is due entirely to M's internal 
activity and not to any action by D. 
What happens in D's absence is that M considers D. She focuses her 
attention. She attends to D. She embarks on a journey of self-criticism in 
which she considers her attitudes as she attends to D. Gradually, M's vision 
of D alters. D comes to be regarded by M not as vulgar but as refreshingly 
simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but cheerful, not juvenile 
but youthful. M's outward behavior is not altered, but her inward vision and 
her judgment are altered dramatically. They are altered not because of any-
thing that has happened in the world of objective action, but because of the 
work M has done within herself, the attention she has paid to D, and the 
internal struggle M has compelled herself to undergo. M may be deluding 
herself, but she is trying to see D justly and lovingly. 
The vision achieved by M, Murdoch says, is the result of moral effort 
and moral imagination.3l At any point, one's actions are frequently deter-
mined-or at least influenced-by what one sees.32 To notice only the mo-
ment of action or choice is to see only the outward moment, but what has 
preceded that choice is the work of attention. Murdoch says, "[I]f we con-
sider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and 
how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall 
not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of 
choosing is already over."33 Indeed, "[t]he ideal situation ... is ... to be 
represented as a kind of 'necessity.' This is something of which saints speak 
and which any artist will readily understand. The idea of a patient, loving 
regard, directed upon a person, a thing, a situation, presents the will not as 
unimpeded movement but as something very much more like 'obedi-
ence.' "34 This is no mystery to judges. As stated above, the facts found 
routinely compel the decision reached. Once a judge determines the facts, 
resolution of the case feels very much like "obedience." 
What is the discipline required of us to move toward more perfection 
in our vision of what confronts us? As for Wei!, the process is not an easy 
one. Indeed, in Murdoch's words, it is "an endless task."35 Our imperfection 
is inevitable. Concepts alter. Courage means something different at forty 
from what it means at twenty. A deepening, altering or complicating pro-
31. Id. at 37. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 36. 
34. Id. at 39. 
35. Id. at 23. 28. 
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cess takes place.36 "Where virtue is concerned we often apprehend more 
than we clearly understand and grow by looking."37 
Murdoch's writing does not address the work of judges, but the issues 
she discusses, like those that confront judges every day, pose dilemmas in 
which every resolution serves and dis serves important values. Murdoch 
writes: 
Should a retarded child be kept at home or sent to an institution? 
Should an elderly relation who is a trouble-maker be cared for or 
asked to go away? Should an unhappy marriage be continued for 
the sake of the children? Should I leave my family in order to do 
political work? Should I neglect them in order to practise my art? 
The love which brings the right answer is an exercise of justice 
and realism and really looking. The difficulty is to keep the atten-
tion fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it from returning 
surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-pity, resent-
ment, fantasy and despair.38 
No matter how we set aside our self-centered rationalizations and fan-
tasies, no matter how good and real our vision, there is no perfect answer to 
these questions. This is a moral reality. It is certainly a religious reality 
because from a religious point of view, omniscience is not available to us. 
And it is certainly a judicial reality. The search for perfect answers to the 
dilemmas that confront us is not possible. Our responsibility is to hear and 
understand as best we can. 
III. JUDICIAL FACTFINDING: ATTENTION AND JUDGING 
The discipline of attention-viewed as a religious imperative by Weil 
and a moral imperative by Murdoch-has special relevance to the work of a 
public factfinder such as a trial judge. Few individuals are given the public 
power to have their vision of the facts translate into state-sanctioned power 
over other human beings. The discipline of attention is the work of all of us, 
but in a very special way it is the work of a judge. 
In legal literature that has focused on factfinding, a much-discussed 
example is Justice Brennan's description39 of how the Supreme Court came 
to decide the case of Goldberg v. Kelly,40 one of the most significant deci-
sions of the Warren Court era. The issue in Goldberg was whether New 
York's procedure of providing welfare recipients with an opportunity to 
contest a proposed termination of benefits in writing before termination 
with an evidentiary hearing after benefits were terminated, was sufficient to 
36. [d. at 29. 
37. [d. at 30. 
38. [d. at 89. 
39. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason. Passion, and "The Progress of the Law." lO CARDOZO 
L. REV. I (1988). 
40. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
2006] FACTFlNDlNG AS A SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE 333 
satisfy due process.41 The Court held that it was not, and that due process 
required a pre-termination hearing.42 
Justice Brennan described his decision-making process as an emo-
tional or intuitive response to a given set of facts or arguments which he 
called "passion."43 Goldberg, he said, can be seen as the expression of the 
importance of passion in governmental conduct, with passion defined as 
"attention to the concrete human realities at stake."44 The New York sys-
tem, he maintained, while a model of rationality in requiring pre-termina-
tion notice and a chance to submit a written opposition, failed to account for 
"the drastic consequences of terminating a recipient's only means of subsis-
tence,"45 the erroneous termination of which would create complete desper-
ation. Written submissions are an inadequate means of demonstrating error 
because the population affected by these rules lacks the education necessary 
to write effectively and the means to obtain professional assistance.46 New 
York's rule, he said, "was blind to the brute fact of dependence."47 "A gov-
ernment insensitive to such a reality cannot be said to treat individuals with 
the respect that due process demands-not because its officials do not rea-
son, but because they cannot understand."48 
Justice Brennan's analysis of what motivated the decision in Goldberg 
as an emotional or intuitive response to the facts appears to neglect what 
was at least as significant-not his response to the facts, but the facts them-
selves: the nature of welfare dependence, the real-world consequences of an 
erroneous termination of benefits and the realistic impact on the welfare-
dependent popUlation of a rule requiring written submissions. Justice Bren-
nan and the rest of the majority responded to the facts, surely enough, but 
what critically got them to the point of response were the facts themselves. 
By looking closely at the plaintiffs' actual situation-by paying attention to 
it-the Court quite easily concluded that due process required other 
procedures. 
The importance of the facts found and emphasized in decision-making 
is the subject of Martha Nussbaum's essay, Poets as Judges, in her book, 
Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life.49 Nussbaum dis-
cusses a number of cases that she believes demonstrate, or fail to demon-
strate, what she terms "the literary judge."50 She defines a literary judge as: 
41 ld. at 255. 
42. ld. at 266. 
43. Brennan, supra note 39, at 9. 
44. ld. at 20. 
45. /d. 
46. ld. at 21 (citing Co/dber/ci, 397 U.s. at 269), 
47. ld, at 22. 
48. Id, 
49. MARTHA C. NCSSBAUM, Poets (/.1' Judges, in POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINA. 
TION AND PUBLIC LIFE 79 (1995). 
50. ld. at 82. 
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one who is able to "imagine vividly, and then to assess judicially, another 
person's pain, to participate in it and then to ask about its significance" as 
"a ... way of learning what the human facts are."51 A decision she cites as 
an example of "literary judging" is Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Carr 
v. Allison Gas Turbine Division. 52 
Carr involved a complaint of sexual harassment in the workplace. The 
facts themselves were largely undisputed, although the legal significance of 
the facts when taken in context was contested. One question was whether 
the verbal and nonverbal conduct to which the plaintiff was exposed was 
sufficiently hostile, intimidating and degrading to affect adversely the con-
ditions of the plaintiff's employment.53 Another question was whether the 
defendant employer's response, or lack thereof, to its employees' behavior 
toward the plaintiff was negligent.54 These are questions of fact, which a 
judge is required to answer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 55 The 
district judge concluded that the workplace conduct to which the plaintiff 
was exposed was sexual banter of a kind common in the workplace, not 
serious enough to affect the conditions of the plaintiff's employment, and 
that the employer was not negligent because it was powerless to stop such 
banter. 56 
Judge Posner, who was empowered to revisit the findings of fact of the 
district judge only if convinced they were clearly erroneous, concluded that 
the plaintiff had proven actionable sexual harassment.5? Judge Posner nar-
rated the facts in considerable detail-more detail, Nussbaum noted, than 
was strictly necessary.58 This is, of course, the way a judge attends to, and 
forces the reader to attend to, the facts he views as salient. Judge Posner, by 
carefully reciting the facts he viewed as important, was attempting to 
demonstrate why the conduct to which the plaintiff was subjected was not 
merely vulgar and obnoxious, but was instead deeply offensive and sexually 
harassing. 
Nussbaum describes Judge Posner's recitation of the facts as demon-
strating a "sympathetic attention to the special plight of people who are 
socially unequal and to a certain extent, therefore, helpless."59 But, as in 
Goldberg, the foundation of the decision was not Judge Posner's emotional 
or intuitive response to the facts, but his attention to the facts. Judge Pos-
ner, as Nussbaum notes, is judicious and calm,60 not "wringing his hands or 
51. ld. at 91. 
52. 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994). 
53. ld. at 1009. 
54. Id. 
55. 42 V.S.c. §§ 2oooe-2000eA (2000). 
56. Carr, 32 F.3d at 1010. 
57. Id. at 1010-11. 
58. NUSSBAUM, supra note 49, at 107. 
59. ld. at 111. 
60. ld. at 109. 
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emoting in the IT.anner of one personally caught up in the situation."61 Both 
Nussbaum and Justice Brennan are clearly worried about whether it is ap-
propriate for judges to act out of sympathy or passion. But they need not be 
so worried. Sympathy or passion is not the driving force behind these opin-
ions. What is driving them is the judge's willingness to look closely at the 
facts, imagine what those facts mean as they affect the people involved and 
then, and only then, respond to the facts by applying a relevant rule of law. 
In addition to her concern that attention to the facts is closely linked to 
sympathy, Nussbaum suggests that attention to the facts biases us toward 
the socially unequal and powerless. It is true that Justice Brennan's opinion 
in Goldberg, like many Supreme Court opinions of the Warren Court era, 
ruled in favor of the socially unequal or powerless. Judge Posner did the 
same, in ruling on behalf of the plaintiff in Carr. This, if true, could be a 
substantial objection to the kind of attention to the facts which I have sug-
gested is a spiritual and moral imperative: that it leads to a bias in favor of 
the weaker party. 
But 1 do not think Nussbaum is entirely correct on the issue of whether 
attention to the facts biases us toward the powerless, if bias is understood as 
suggesting prejudice or partiality. Paying attention to the facts may at times 
prevent the decision-maker from acquiescing in a normal bias in favor of 
the establishment, the class of which the decision-maker is almost certainly 
a member. And Title VII harassment cases, like Carr, require us to look at 
the inequality of position between the alleged harasser and the alleged 
harassee.62 Harassment is largely about whether conduct of supervisors to-
ward their employees is permissible-the conduct, in other words, to which 
people with power in the workplace can subject less powerful people. With-
out considering inequality of condition, we would be unable to assess the 
challenged conduct as the law requires. Similarly, Justice Brennan's opin-
ion in Goldberg was about the effect of a certain procedure on a certain 
class of people, and whether that effect on those people was constitutionally 
adequate. Rather than resulting from some improper bias, these opinions 
pay attention precisely to what they should: rather than exemplifying a bias 
in favor of the powerless, they are seeing reality as it is. Insofar as an accu-
rate assessment of reality causes a decision-maker to decide in favor of the 
less powerful person, the decision-maker is simply doing what the oath of 
61, Id, 
62, See, e.g., Crandell v. KY. Coil. of Osteopathic Med .. 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 319 (S.D,N.Y. 
2000) (unequal power relationship between plaintiff and the hospital resident charged with evalu-
ating her perfonnance supported finding of a hostile environment), Many courts have relied upon 
Catharine MacKinnon's definition of sexual harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual 
requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power." CATHARINE l'vI.;'CKINNON, SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN I (1979), See, e.g., Rowinsky v, Bryan Indep, Sch, Disc., 
80 F.3d 1006, lOll (5th Cir. 1996); Turley v. Union Carbide Corp" 618 F. Supp. 143R. 1441 
(S,D, W. Va. 1985): Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch, of Med .. 613 F. Supp, 1360, 1366 (E.D. Pa. 
1985). 
336 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS L4 W JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2 
federal judges requires: to "do equal right to the poor and to the rich."63 In 
short, we do not see accurately if we fail to notice-or notice but do not 
absorb-the fact that a man is lying injured in the street. We do not see 
accurately if we assume that a woman in the workplace called obscene 
names and subjected to conduct that cripples her ability to work effectively 
is subjected to only insignificant banter. If we pay close attention to the 
powerless, we may notice that they are truly being hurt. 
It is true that in our professional role, we owe fidelity to more than the 
man lying injured in the street. We owe fidelity to those who pass him by, if 
required to pass judgment on their conduct, and must pay attention to their 
circumstances as well. We also owe fidelity to any rules of law relevant to 
the situation. If, for instance, everyone was driving by the injured man in 
automobiles and the rules of the road, plus ordinary common sense, made 
stopping extremely dangerous to oneself and others, we would have to pay 
attention to those rules in assessing the conduct of those involved. In cases 
such as Carr, we would fail as judges if we neglected to attend to the needs 
of the employer as well as to the sufferings of the plaintiff. Moreover, we 
owe fidelity not only to the parties before us, but to others who will be 
affected by our decisions. In a case like Goldberg, a responsible decision 
would pay attention not only to the situation of the plaintiffs, but to the 
impact of additional procedural requirements on the defendant and on other 
affected people. 
IV. SYSTEMIC PRESSURES ON JUDGES NOT TO PAY ATTENTION 
A compelling treatment of the subject of the importance of attention in 
deciding cases does not even mention Wei! or Murdoch. It is Anthony 
Kronman's The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession,64 and 
its subject is the decline of the ideal of the lawyer-statesman in all aspects 
of our legal culture. The lawyer-statesman, as described by Kronman, pos-
sesses not only intellectual ability and professional knowledge, but qualities 
of character which give him or her an unusual excellence in judgment or 
deliberation: being, among other things, "more calm or cautious than most 
people and better able to sympathize with a wide range of conflicting points 
of view."65 Indeed, excellence in judgment requires "two opposite-seeming 
ld. 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2004). In its entirety, the statute provides: 
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affinnation 
before performing the duties of his office: "I, ______ , do solemnly swear (or 
affinn) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the 
poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perfonn all 
the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. So help me God." 
64. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
(1993). 
65. ld. at 15. 
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dispositions, that of compassion, on the one hand, and that of detachment, 
on the other."66 A person faced with a difficult decision must make an 
fort to see all the claims at issue in their best light and feel the power and 
appeal of each. At the same time, he or she must remain sufficiently de-
tached to survey the alternatives from a perspective different from the point 
of view internal to each.n? Excellence in deliberation or judgment requires 
combination of the dispositions of compassion and detachment, even as 
they pull in opposite directions.68 Kronman calls this ability to entertain 
these opposing dispositions "bifocality."69 One of them, which he variously 
refers to as "sympathy" or "compassion," requires focused attention on each 
of the competing claims.?O The other, which Kronman calls "detachment." 
requires that one refrain from embracing any of the competing claims too 
easily or quickly, despite the possible ease and comfort of doing SO.?l 
The good lawyer exhibits this kind of good character, and it is a kind 
of character which legal education is designed to inculcate. The case 
method of legal education requires an unwillingness to take the soundness 
of any judicial opinion for granted and a commitment to placing the con-
flicting positions presented by the lawsuit in their most attractive light, re-
gardless of how they are treated in the opinion.72 Law students' training in 
the case method involves the study of concrete disputes in which the stu-
dents are required to see things from different points of view and entertain 
the claims associated with each, while defending or criticizing these points 
of view from the judge's detached perspective.?3 "The case method thus 
works simultaneously to strengthen both the student's powers of sympa-
thetic understanding and his ability to suppress all sympathies in favor of a 
judge's scrupulous neutrality."?4 Further, and most important, "it increases 
his tolerance for the disorientation that movement back and forth between 
these different attitudes occasions."?5 The case method thus "serves as a 
forcing ground for the moral imagination by cultivating that peculiar bifo-
cality [which is] its most essential property."?6 The lawyer-statesman thus 
conceived possesses practical wisdom in deliberating about ends: an excel-
lence which depends upon an appreciation of the diversity of human goods, 
based upon a strong and vivid moral imagination; and a habit of civic-mind-
66. Id. at 72. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. [d. at 72. 113. 
70. Id. at 72. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 113. 
73. ld. 
74. Id. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
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edness, reinforced through disciplined insistence on the priority of the judi-
cial or neutral point of view. 
While changes in the legal academy and the practice of law over ap-
proximately the last twenty-five years have made these areas of profes-
sionallife increasingly less hospitable to the ideal of the lawyer-statesman, 
one might think that the ideal at least retains its appeal among judges in the 
adjudicative branch of law. Inasmuch as law students learn from judicial 
opinions and practicing lawyers must advise their clients and practice their 
advocacy in their expectation of how judges will respond, one would hope 
that in the adjudicative branch the ideal of bifocality would be alive and 
well. Judging, Kronman observes, 
[A]lways starts from and returns to the specific facts of a concrete 
controversy, requires a combination of sympathy and detachment, 
and often presents the person engaged in it with conflicts between 
incommensurable goods, while nevertheless requiring him or her 
to pursue what I have termed the good of political fraternity.77 
It is "a paradigm of deliberation, and so here if anywhere in the legal pro-
fession practical wisdom ought to be a well-understood and valued trait."78 
Unfortunately, Kronman argues, the professional culture in which 
judges work has undergone a reorientation comparable to that which has 
occurred in teaching and practice, and which increasingly depreciates the 
lawyer-statesman ideal. This change in the culture of judging would be a 
cause for concern if considered in isolation, but its impact is potentially far 
more significant when the impact of judging on teaching and practice is 
considered. The pressure of the caseload is, for Kronman, the primary cause 
of these changes because it has forced the judicial system to adapt in ways 
that distance judges from direct involvement with the parties' conflicting 
claims and, as a result, weakens the judge's deliberative imagination.79 
The two primary adaptations the judicial system has developed to deal 
with an increasingly overwhelming number of cases are as follows: first, 
"managerial judging," in which judges become deeply involved in the pre-
trial management of cases including settlement and other ways of maneu-
vering cases in their pretrial stages (usually not involving any formal, 
public statement of reasons) to try to bring cases to closure without the need 
for a trial; and second, the "bureaucratization of the judiciary," the huge 
expansion in the number and importance of judges' support staff, including 
such assistive personnel as elbow law clerks, staff attorneys, special mas-
ters, and magistrate judges.8o In the case of managerial judging, the danger 
is the pressure on judges to form opinions about cases at an ever-earlier 
77. Id. at 319. 
78. Id. at 319-20. 
79. Id. at 320, 325. 
80. Id. at 322-24. For other treatments of the same issue, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1999) and Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to 
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stage, before a full adversarial presentation of the parties' claims.sl For rea-
sons that Kronman describes, based on the work of Judith Resnick, "mana-
gerial judging ... tends to encourage decisions that are more precipitous 
and prone to personal bias and so to compromise the work of judging at its 
core."82 In the case of the bureaucratization of the judiciary, the danger to 
the quality of adjudication is perhaps even greater because the initial assess-
ment of cases is increasingly delegated to some judicial assistant, "depriv-
ing the judge of those 'critical educational experiences' that a more intimate 
relation to the case might furnish."83 The task of judging is often divided 
among the judge and the judge's assistants, diminishing both the sense of 
personal responsibility judges feel for their decisions and the sense that a 
judicial decision has been made by an individual with some recognizable 
identity rather than an impersonal institution. 84 
The idea of the "vanishing trial" is the subject of much discussion in 
judges' conferences and academic symposia,85 and the percentage of cases 
that end in some kind of settlement or plea is very large. When disputes are 
not tried, but are resolved in some other way, they are more often presented 
not in their most vital and authentic form-from the mouths of human be-
ings who describe what they are going through-but secondhand, in law-
yers' summaries or in a proposed resolution of the dispute in a law clerk's 
draft, or magistrate judge's or special master's proposed opinion.86 This 
means that to an ever-increasing extent, the stimulus to a judge's imagina-
tion which comes from his or her direct involvement with competing claims 
is disappearing and, with it, Kronman argues, a source of strength for the 
quality of deliberation. He says: 
The more directly [the judge] confronts a plurality of claims, the 
more strongly [he] is likely to feel the need to empathically en-
gage each on its own terms while making a commitment to none. 
When claims compete directly in this way, they produce a kind of 
friction that arouses the imagination and makes the need for it 
quite clear. But when a judge encounters the disputes that come 
before him from the point of view of an earlier decision that has 
already arranged and ranked the claims of those involved, this 
Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our 
Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1004-07 (2003). 
81. KRONMAN, supra note 64, at 324. 
82. [do 
83. !d. at 325 (footnote omitted). 
84. [d. 
85. See, e.g., Symposium, The Civil Trial: Adaptation and Alternatives, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1251 (2005); Symposium, Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 59 (2004); Sym-
posium, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); John Lande, "The Vanish-
ing Trial" Report, 10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 19 (2004). 
86. KRONMAN, supra note 64, at 326. 
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friction is weaker and less likely to provoke his imaginative 
powers.8? 
It would require the length of a book, not an article, to describe thor-
oughly the ways in which trial judges (the people on whom our system 
depends to pay attention to the facts) are distancing themselves from 
factfinding in the name of efficiency-or are being forced to do so. Con-
gress seems well aware that allowing judges to engage with the facts may, 
as in the parable of the Good Samaritan and in the analysis of Weil and 
Murdoch, cause them to respond to the facts. In the area of habeas corpus, 
for instance, Congress has severely limited the power of federal district 
courts to look at the facts and has restricted the legal rules the district court 
can apply.88 In the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines89-the status of which has 
been thrown into some doubt by the Supreme Court's opinion in United 
States v. Booker90-Congress prohibited trial judges from relying on a 
range of factors that would normally be considered highly relevant to the 
crafting of an appropriate sentence.91 From within the courts themselves has 
come an enormous increase in the use of summary judgment, a procedure 
which authorizes the resolution of large numbers of civil cases based on 
written evidence predominantly sculpted by lawyers and factual presump-
tions developed by appellate courts,92 sometimes applied in factually inap-
propriate circumstances. In these cases, the parties themselves are never 
given the opportunity to present to the judge their accounts of what hap-
87. [d. at 327. 
88. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"'), Pub. L. No. 
104-132 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.c. §§ 2241-55 (1996». 
89. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2006). 
90. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
91. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(d)(I) (2006) (forbidding 
courts from departing from the applicable guideline range based on "[a]ny circumstance specifi-
cally prohibited as a ground for departure in §§ 5HI.1O (Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Relig-
ion, and Socio-Economic Status), 5H1.l2 (Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar 
Circumstances), the third and last sentences of 5HIA (Physical Condition, Including Drug or 
Alcohol Dependence or Abuse; Gambling Addiction), the last sentence of 5K2.12 (Coercion and 
Duress), and 5K2.l9 (Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts)."). 
92. Many of these presumptions can be found in employment discrimination cases, which 
make up a huge proportion of every federal district judge's workload. Consider, for example, the 
so-called "same actor inference," which arises when a single actor is responsible for both the 
hiring and the firing of a plaintiff alleging discrimination. In such cases, courts in many circuits 
hold that the plaintiff must overcome a "strong inference" that he or she was not the victim of 
discrimination, thus making it difficult for the discrimination plaintiff to survive summary judg-
ment. See, e.g., Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (adopting the same 
actor inference and upholding trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant); 
Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 804 n.9 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting the Sixth Circuit's recent endorse-
ment of the same actor inference); Lowe v. 1.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174-75 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (affirming trial court's grant of directed verdict for the defendant on the basis of the 
same actor inference); Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797-98 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[I]n cases where 
the hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within a 
relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was 
not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer."). 
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pened, and the judge never has an opportunity to pay attention to their 
accounts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the origins of our system of justice are, as far as we know, 
secular, it cannot be doubted that the judicial system has developed in ways 
that give structural protection to the spiritual and moral imperatives that 
concerned Weil and Murdoch. Trials, factfinding and opinion-writing com-
pel judges to hear, understand, and come to terms with the competing 
claims of the human beings whose disputes they are required to resolve. 
The trial court is an institution which, at least in theory, allows individuals 
to tell their stories directly to the person or persons charged with resolving 
their disputes. It requires, at least in theory, that judges and juries pay atten-
tion to the people and facts involved. It requires, in Kronman's words, "the 
imaginative probing of specific cases."93 
In Justice Brennan's account of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Goldberg, and in Martha Nussbaum's discussion of the enhanced quality of 
decision-making of which her ideal "literary judge" is capable, it is possible 
to see and critique what "attention to facts" means in the judicial context. It 
is possible to see that judges can pay a great deal of attention to the reality 
which confronts them. It is possible to see that the quality of their attention 
bears directly on the quality of their adjudication. It is possible to see that 
attention to facts translates into results in the judicial arena just as directly 
as it did on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. It is possible to see that who a judge is, as a spiritual and moral 
being, has a direct impact on that judge's decisions in ways that have little 
to do with doctrinal similarities and differences. 
As judges and as human beings, we face many pressures to pay atten-
tion badly-pressures of time, pressures of economy, and most important, 
the sheer difficulty of putting ourselves out of the picture and paying real 
attention to the other. As Kronman has warned, our institutions are evolving 
in ways which are likely to place less value on paying attention and make it 
increasingly difficult to do so. Nevertheless, it is the spiritual and moral 
core of what we do, and it is worth our disciplined effort to do it as well as 
we can. 
93. KRONMAN, supra note 64, at 362. 
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